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Abstract: This paper uses provincial macro-data from the mid-1980s onwards to investigate the 
determinants of land-use choice in rural China, by paying a particular attention to the decision to 
plant trees as competing with agriculture. The evidence supports the importance of economic 
motivations in the afforestation decision. A profit-seeking behavior is found to be at stake in the 
decision to plant trees, which is made according to both the relative profitability of forestry 
against agriculture, and their relative risks. Afforestation is also found to strongly depend on the 
pressure upon land as well as on household wealth.  
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Summary: 
During the reform period, Chinese forest resources have increased both in coverage and in 
standing stock. This is mainly the result of constant afforestation efforts that have more than 
compensated deforestation during the period. The aim of this paper is to examine the forces that 
shape the afforestation incentives of rural economic agents, in the context of rapid economic 
changes since the end of the 1970s. As land resources are scarce compared with the huge 
population in China, the afforestation activity is analyzed within a framework of land allocation 
between agriculture and forestry, under the hypothesis that the two sectors compete for land. 
Several factors can influence activity choices. First, with market developments during the reform 
period, the choice between agriculture and afforestation is expected to become increasingly 
sensitive to the relative returns of the two activities, namely, timber prices relative to agricultural 
prices. Second, as predicted by the portfolio choice theory, abundant risks in a rural economy 
may induce a diversification strategy by combining agriculture and forestry activities. Third, land-
use choice is determined by demographic pressure on land and land quality. Fourth, the changing 
socio-economic environment in rural China, measured through rural households wealth and the 
existence of alternative mechanisms of insurance against risks, such as diversification from 
agriculture to rural industry, can be expected to have an impact on land allocation choices. 
Evidence from Chinese provinces during the reform period confirms the important role of 
economic changes in the agro-forestry land allocation. The empirical results show that an 
increase of forestry prices relative to agricultural prices and a risk increment in agricultural 
production and price variability all lead to a higher land ratio for afforestation at the expense of 
agriculture. Similarly, rural wealth is positively related to afforestation efforts. On the contrary, 
rural population pressure over land reduces afforestation incentives. However, this negative 
impact is offset by the improvement of land quality and agricultural productivity which can 
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determinants of land-use choice in rural China, by paying a particular attention to the decision to 
plant trees as competing with agriculture. The evidence supports the importance of economic 
motivations in the afforestation decision. A profit-seeking behavior is found to be at stake in the 
decision to plant trees, which is made according to both the relative profitability of forestry 
against agriculture, and their relative risks. Afforestation is also found to strongly depend on the 
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Since the implementation of the reform and opening-door policy at the end of the 1970s, 
natural resources and environmental conservation in China has been influenced by opposite 
trends. Although on the one hand, an increasing concern on the necessity to protect resources 
and to promote biodiversity conservation began to emerge from the beginning of the 1980s 
onwards, on the other hand, great economic changes induced by the set of reform policies put a 
growing pressure on natural systems and the environment (Smil, 1997; Harkness, 1998). This has 
been clearly the case for air pollution and water conservation, which are threatened by the 
unprecedented increase in industrial production and fertilizer use in agriculture. Higher income 
levels generated by the overall economic growth also contributed to increasing pressure on 
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natural resources and particularly on land, by accelerating demand for agricultural goods as well 
as for housing and furniture goods.  
Concerning forest resources, pressures not only came from land use reallocation needs, 
but also from timber resources needs, as energy sources or construction materials. However, 
despite these pressures, the last 25 years have been characterized by an increase in total forested 
land, which indicates a reversal from former trends of “net” deforestation (Shi and Xu, 2000). 
Although this positive trend does not mean that forest-clearing behaviors have disappeared, it 
nonetheless indicates that tree plantings have more than compensated the overall deforestation.  
Achieving balanced growth in forested land so as to increase available forest resources is 
a major challenge that China now faces in order to both satisfy the growing demand for wood in 
China and relieve its pressure on international forest resources. Given that China’s forest 
resources only account for 4% of the world forest, while China represents 7% of the world land 
area and 21% of the world population (FAO, 2003), China can be considered as “forest-
deficient” (Lu et al., 2002, p. 9). As such, and being the second largest timber importer in the 
world (Zhang, 2000), China’s forest-related choices necessarily have strong implications on 
international reserves. 
As the increase of Chinese forest resources over the last 25 years is largely the result of 
intensive tree planting activities, the aim of this paper is to assess the determinants of 
afforestation, by focusing on the economic changes that can influence rural forest-related 
behaviors. Answering the question of the economic incentives for rural economic agents to plant 
trees is important to understand the evolution of forest resources over the period and to target 
further policies in order to maintain a sustainable level of forest area. This paper draws on 
microeconomic theoretical analysis of rural economic agents’ behavior and uses macro data at 
the province level to highlight the determinants of afforestation efforts in a context of rapid 
economic and institutional changes.  
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Economic agents involved in the planting activity in China mainly include rural 
households, local collectivities and State forestry units. However, as pointed out in the literature 
(e.g. Hyde et al. 2003, Xu et al. 2004), State forestry units usually do not follow economic 
incentives1. In particular, most State forests have been in financial arrears for years and have 
seriously depleted their forest stocks, despite numerous centrally sponsored attempts at 
reforestation. Moreover, parts of reforestation programs held by State-owned units are driven by 
environmental or wasteland recovery considerations. Ideally, we should thus separate State 
afforestation and afforestation undertaken by households or communities, but limited data 
availability precludes from disentangling State afforestation from collective or individual 
afforestation. Therefore, we keep total afforestation as our variable of interest, even though we 
acknowledge that it may not be the most focused variable to evaluate households and 
communities responses to economic incentives in planting trees2.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the state of forests and 
afforestation activities in China since the end of the 1970s. This section particularly shows that 
the recent period has been characterized by an increase in forest cover in China, with, however, 
strong regional disparities in afforestation efforts. The aim of the subsequent sections is then to 
highlight the determinants of afforestation. Section 3 develops theoretical hypotheses on the 
determinants of land-use choice between competing rural activities. Section 4 presents 
econometric testing of these hypotheses, using provincial macro-data from 1984 onwards. 
Section 5 summarizes the findings and discusses some policy implications. 
                                                     
1 We are grateful to an anonymous referee of the review for pointing out the distinction between State forests and non-State 
forests in the underlying motivations for afforestation or reforestation. 
2 Hyde et al. (2003) indicate that over the reform period, forest land areas have grown more rapidly in collective forests than in 
State-owned forests. This implies that even though we cannot separate State forests and non-State forests in afforestation efforts, 
we can expect that our results reflect at least part of the “true” behavior of households and communities, and that they would be 
even better if our measure for afforestation excluded State afforestation. 
 7
2. China’s forests evolution and planting activities since the end of the 1970s 
 
a. Forest resources: trends and regional distribution 
Forest resources in China have been growing steadily in both coverage and stock during 
the last 25 years. According to national forest resource censuses data, forest cover has increased 
from 113.3 million hectares in 1981 to 156.8 million hectares in 1998, which represents an 
increase in forested land of 43.5 million hectares over the period. The standing timber stock has 
simultaneously increased by 2 billions cubic meters (Table 1). 
<Insert Table 1> 
As we will discuss later, this increase in forest resources is undoubtedly the result of 
active policies, including afforestation efforts. As a result, China now has the largest plantation 
area in the world (46.7 million hectares), which accounts for 31% of its total forest area (Shi and 
Xu, 2000; Lu et al., 2002). However, this increase should also be related to the continuous 
changes in definition for forest areas all over the period. As underlined by Richardson (1990, p. 
89), “on 28 April 1986, the State Council promulgated regulations for the implementation of the 
Consolidated Forest Law. Grassland and woodland with 30 percent canopy cover were in future 
to be defined as forest resources (formerly 40 percent canopy cover was so defined); this 
measure, by a stroke, increased the forest land area from 273 to 287 million hectares”. The 
definition for forest area has been further widened since then. In 1994, the former Ministry of 
Forestry promulgated a document on the “principal technical norms for forest resources 
census”, which redefined the extent of canopy cover needed to record land in forest resources as 
20 percent. This change has been later ratified in propositions for the implementation of the 
Forest Law in January 2000 (State Forestry Administration, 2000b). This change in definition 
might at least partly explain the huge increase in forest cover between the 4th and the 5th census 
(from 13.8% to 16.4%, Table 1). 
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In a regional perspective, four forest regions can be identified (Yin, 1994). They are: the 
Northeast National Forest Region (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia), the Southwest 
National Forest Region (Yunnan, Sichuan and Tibet), the Southern Collective Forest Region and 
the North/Northeast/Northwest (or Three-North) Farm Forest Region. The two first categories 
(Northeast and Southwest) cover most of State-owned forests, where natural forests are mainly 
located and which serve as major traditional timber production bases. The Southern Collective 
Forest Region, composed of 10 provinces (see Table 2), mainly entails man-made forests, which 
have been developed quite recently. Lastly, the Three-North Farm Forest Region is made of the 
rest of the country (14 provinces), where forest resources are scarce. As indicated in Table 2, 
forest resources are highly concentrated in the first three regions, which account for 84 percent 
of forest cover in China while only 58 percent of total land area. Ninety percent of timber 
standing stock is located in these regions, where most forestry activities are conducted. 
<Insert Table 2> 
Despite rising trends in coverage and stock, China’s forestry however faces important 
constraints related to the level of resources on one side, and to the quality of existing forests on 
the other side. Indeed, overall forest resources remain scarce as compared to the world average. 
They represent only 16.4% of China’s total land area, half of the world average, and 0.13 hectare 
per capita, considerably less than the world average of 0.65 hectare per capita (FAO, 2003). 
Timber stock comparisons lead to the same gap as compared to the world average, since the 
standing stock volume amounts to 9.7 cubic meters per capita while the world average is around 
66 cubic meters per capita (Yin, 1998; State Forestry Administration, 2000b).  
Moreover, both the level of reserves for timber forests and the forest age structure have 
steadily deteriorated over time, leading to a lowering quality (Yin, 1998; Shi and Xu, 2000; 
Rozelle et al., 2004). While the level of forest stocks was around 80 cubic meters per hectare in 
1980 (Yin, 1998), it now amounts to only 72.5 cubic meters per hectare. Although this level has 
increased for man-made forests taken alone (from 22.5 to 34.5 cubic meters per hectare), it 
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however remains insufficient to make man-made forests a major timber resource in a near 
future. In terms of age distribution, according to the fifth census, young forests represent more 
than two-third of forest land (71%), but only 41% of forest volume, which underlines their low 
productivity (45 cubic meters per hectare). The proportion of mature or near-mature forests is 
much more important in forest volume (59%), but many of them are located in non-accessible 
areas.  
These divergent evolutions indicate that the biggest challenge for forestry in China does 
not relate to forest cover destruction, but it is rather linked to a decreasing diversity and the 
depletion of natural forests and/or mature forests. This problem has been pointed out recently, 
in particular after the 1998 Yangtze River flood and the subsequent implementation of the 
Natural Forest Protection Program, which entails a logging ban on natural forests in 17 
provinces along the Yangtze and the Yellow River Basins (Xu et al., 2002). At the same time, a 
target of reforestation, through natural regeneration or artificial planting, has been set out to shift 
the source of timber supply from natural forests to planted forests. 
 
b. Afforestation efforts 
Apart from statistical changes mentioned above, the observed rising trend in forest 
resources is above all the consequence of the substantial efforts that China made to plant trees as 
well as to protect existing resources since economic reforms were launched in the late 1970s. In 
addition to the symbolic designation of a national day for tree planting (March 12), a variety of 
national campaigns and market-based incentives have been designed to encourage tree planting 
since the end of the 1970s. Various large-scale afforestation programs3 include the “National 
compulsory tree-planting campaign” launched in 1981, the “Four sides” afforestation campaign, 
which encourages tree planting around houses and villages, and along roads and rivers, and a 
                                                     
3 A list of these programs, including their coverage and objective is given in Lu et al. (2002). 
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number of regional afforestation campaigns, such as the “Three-North Shelterbelt Development 
Program” in 1978, the “Coastal Shelterbelt Development Program” in 1991, the “Taihang 
Mountain Afforestation Program” in 1990, etc. 
Other policies designed to stimulate the active participation of a “private” sector in forest 
activities include the adoption of a national forest policy in 1981, characterized by the so-called 
“Three fix policy”, aimed at securing resources rights (Lu et al., 2002). As highlighted by 
Richardson (1990), the three objectives of this policy were “the rapid resolution of forest rights 
of ownership and usufruct, the demarcation of wasteland for household reforestation and the 
establishment of contract responsibility systems for collective forestry operations” (p. 187). The 
Forest Law, issued in 1984 and amended in 1998, reinvigorated the “three fix” policy by allowing 
private use rights over trees (Lu et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the introduction and the generalization of the forestry household 
responsibility system4 gave more resources such as forestry land to rural households, and favored 
tree-plantings (Zhang et al., 2000), although the land tenure insecurity related to this system may 
have had negative impacts on forestry, as highlighted by Yin and Newman (1997) and Harkness 
(1998). In particular, Harkness (1998) emphasizes the fact that unsecured property rights led to 
sub-optimal forest-clearing behaviors, since they both discouraged forestry long-term 
investments and provided in turn incentives to clear more forests as a way to claim property 
rights over land. 
Simultaneously, the designation of protected areas and, more recently, the 
implementation of the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP, 1998) and the Sloping Land 
                                                     
4 The household responsibility system first implemented in agriculture has been expanded to forested land in the beginning of the 
1980s. It basically involved transferring use rights and management responsibilities from the collective to rural households or 
cooperatives. Although the in fine responsibility remained under the local forestry bureaus, this system aimed at granting 
households with greater autonomy in forest management.  
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Conversion Program (SLCP, 1999) aimed at protecting existing resources, as well as encouraging 
afforestation (Xu et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2004).  
China’s transition towards a market-based economy has also been accompanied by a 
decentralization process that gave more responsibilities to local governments in the case of 
agriculture and forestry, and to rural households in the management of natural resources. To 
enforce incentives to plant trees, afforestation responsibility has been decentralized to local 
leaders in 1984. As local governments have better information about local conditions and 
preferences, they are indeed expected to make greater efforts to protect and improve their 
natural resource bases. A few years later, afforestation even became a criterion for performance 
evaluation of local leaders and in 1990, the allocation of the harvesting quota has been linked to 
afforestation. All these measures contributed to give local governments more responsibilities in 
terms of fixed-assets investments, production decisions and resources exploitation (Zhang et al., 
1999).  
Afforestation efforts in China resulted in the following planting trends. As can be seen 
from Figure 1, there is an upward trend of planted area over time: plantings averaged 5 million 
hectares a year during the 1970s, and nearly 6 million hectares a year during the 1980s and 1990s 
(excluding 1984 and 1985). During this period, 2 years (1984 and 1985) show much higher rate 
of afforestation, the area of afforestation being higher than 8 million hectares a year. The higher 
level of afforestation can be partly explained by the fact that during these two years, liberalization 
reforms accelerated before being suddenly stopped in 1986. Indeed, several policy measures have 
been adopted to further liberalize timber prices and markets as well as to accelerate property 
rights changes up to the mid 1980s. In 1984, a larger portion of forestland has been attributed to 
farmers in the south, and more freedom given concerning the use of forest production after 
quota fulfillment. The same year, the central government decentralized the afforestation 
responsibility to local leaders where forest is collectively owned, and in the case of state forest 
farms, afforestation also became part of contracts established with the State. A complementary 
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explanation to the unusual afforestation observed in 1984 and 1985 is that these years followed 
the massive movement of deforestation that occurred when the household responsibility system 
was extended to forestry lands (see above). 
<Insert Figure 1> 
Again, it is important to point out potential definition problems, which might lead to an 
overestimation of positive trends in forest resources in China. As afforestation only measures the 
area of trees planted rather than effectively established areas (Richardson, 1990), questions on 
survival rates and quality issues are not taken into account in this kind of data. 
Since the 1984 Forest Law, forests are classified according to their use into the following 
5 categories: timber forests, shelter forests, economic forests, fuel forests and forests for special 
use (See Appendix 1 for a definition of these categories). According to the fifth census, they 
represent respectively 65%, 14%, 16%, 3% and 3% of total forested land in China. Figure 2 
shows the evolution of the distribution of afforestation according to the type of forest planted 
during the 1990s. At the beginning of the 1990s, most of the plantings have been done in timber 
forests, which represented 60 percent of total plantings. Shelter forests came second, with a 
share of 22 percent of total afforestation and economic forests ranked third with a share of 12 
percent. However, this uneven distribution has changed during the 1990s, when both shelter 
forests and economic forests recorded a huge increase in their share of total planting. This 
evolution can be linked with the growing concern about the necessity to protect environment 
and forests resources (especially with the implementation of the Natural Forest Protection 
Program in 1998 and the Sloping Land Conversion Program in 1999), as well as the development 
of non-timber forestry activities in South China. 
<Insert Figure 2> 
Looking at the regional distribution also reveals substantial differences in afforestation 
efforts (Table 2). On the one hand, southern provinces planted on average a higher area of trees 
as a share of their total land area throughout the 1981-2001 period. As suggested by the 
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distribution by forest type, these provinces mainly focused on timber forests and economic 
forests, the share of shelter forests being much lower than the national average. These provinces 
have several common characteristics, among which predominantly collective property rights, 
rapid economic changes, a relatively efficient agricultural sector and a higher income level. On 
the other hand, major timber production bases of State forest regions from the North and 
mixed-managed forest regions from the South-West show a substantially lower ratio of 
afforestation to total land area. This regional pattern of afforestation efforts supports the usually 
highlighted trend of a decreasing natural forest and a growing forest cover in regions that were 
not traditionally timber bases.  
This rapid review of the current state of forests and afforestation in China highlights 
some of the challenges that forestry in China now faces, and which constitute the background 
for this paper. It particularly shows that although the forested land area increased on average by 
2.5% a year between the third (1983-88) and the fifth (1994-98) census (Table 1), China can still 
be regarded as forest deficient by international standards. In the context of a growing demand 
for wood in China, it is hence important to analyze the determinants of afforestation to target 
policies towards an efficient management of China’s forestry, in order to reduce pressure upon 
international forest resources. 
 
3. Framework of forest land-use choice 
 
A range of papers have recently studied the determinants of forest cover variation in 
China, using data based either on forest inventories or on small-scale surveys conducted by the 
authors (see Yin and Newman, 1997; Rozelle et al., 2000, 2004; Zhang et al., 2000; Xu et al., 
2004). They highlight the important role of economic and institutional factors such as relative 
prices and changes in land tenure in the evolution of forest resources. Our objective here is 
slightly different since we aim at determining the factors which can explain tree plantings efforts. 
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Apart from the State, which owns approximately one third of forests, two categories of actors 
can be involved in tree planting activities in China. They are on one side, local communities 
(including local governments) and on the other side, individuals. According to Lu et al. (2002), 
“by 1985 households were estimated to be responsible for over 50 per cent of the increase in 
forest area” (p. 23), and, “by 1995, an estimated 95 per cent of all collective households were 
involved in some form of contract tenure arrangements in forest land” (p. 1). This is probably 
the result of economic deregulation and the introduction of the household forestry responsibility 
system from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. Meanwhile, along with the advancement of 
reforms and market institutional development, forestry producers, rural households, and local 
communities have been more and more sensitive to economic factors. In this context, although a 
portion of China’s afforestation has been driven by environmental considerations, such as shelter 
forests planted by the State, economic factors can be expected to have an increasing role in 
afforestation activities during the reform period.  
As a mountainous country where mountains and plateaus account for more than two-
third of total land area (Wang and Hu, 1999), China is characterized by relatively scarce land 
resources. Its topographical characteristics imply unfavorable natural conditions to economic 
development and a strong concentration of the huge population on a reduced space: in 2002, 
94% of the Chinese population was living on 46% of total land. They also make China a weakly-
endowed country in terms of arable land, which covers only 10% of the territory. 
Facing the land constraint, decision makers have to make a careful land-use choice 
between alternative productive activities, including both agricultural and non-agricultural 
(pasture, forestry, etc.) activities. Zhang et al. (2000) have illustrated for Hainan province the land 
allocation decision among natural forests, degraded land, tree plantation, tropical crops, 
cultivation land and other. In a broader nationwide perspective, we will assume here that forestry 
competes for land mainly with agriculture in order to simplify the analysis. Therefore, the 
question raised is about the determinants of this land allocation decision between agriculture and 
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forestry. Undoubtedly, this is a strong assumption insofar as China has some barren land more 
suitable for forestry than for agriculture. However, under a high demographic pressure on scarce 
land, wasteland is likely to be used for agriculture production, as what occurred in the 1960s with 
the nationwide generalization of the “Dazhai Model”.5 Therefore, agriculture can be considered 
as a competing or potentially competing activity to forestry.6  
The land allocation decision between agriculture and forestry can be analyzed within a 
simple theoretical framework of activity choice, as illustrated by Zhang (2000) and Zhang et al. 
(2000). Economic agents, such as rural households or local communities, allocate their land 
between tree planting and agriculture so as to get the highest rent from the use of their land. In 
this respect, the criteria that determine why a landowner chooses a particular use for land are 
related to a classical profit-seeking behavior in which decision is made according to the relative 
profitability of competing activities (prices), risk considerations, land quality, and the socio-
economic and institutional environment. 
α being the proportion of land an agent chooses to allocate to afforestation, the agro-
forestry land-use choice can be analyzed in a reduced-form equation as follows:  
  ),,,( EqRpαα =        (1) 
where p stands for output prices, R for both market risks and production risks, q represents land 
quality, and E the socio-economic and institutional environment.  
As far as profitability is concerned, land allocation is determined by the relative return of 
competing activities (Zhang et al., 2000). During the reform period, market institutional 
developments have gradually made Chinese producers more profit-oriented and more responsive 
                                                     
5 It consisted in converting sloping hills into terrace land to increase grain production.  
6 This assumption can be regarded as rather “consistent” with the observed pattern in China. To give a recent example, the 
Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) launched in the late 1990s called for the conversion of agriculture on sloping lands 
into forests or grasslands (Xu et al., 2002). Furthermore, our field observation in a rural county of Beijing municipality gives some 
support to this assumption, since a large portion of fruit trees planted by rural households are growing on arable land. 
 16
to market signals as price changes. Since 1978, State procurement prices of timber and other 
forest products have been increased several times.7 Meanwhile, timber markets have developed 
rapidly, especially in the 1990s. A national timber market has been created in Beijing, and by 
1994, a great number of regional timber markets were established in the whole country.8 With 
the development of market mechanisms, land allocation between agriculture and afforestation 
can then be expected to be more sensitive to relative prices changes, an increase in forestry 
product prices relative to agricultural product prices leading to an increase in the ratio of land 
allocated to forest, other things being equal.  
The second criterion is to cope with risks which are abundant in rural areas. There are 
essentially two sources of risks. One is related to agricultural production risks, such as timing and 
quantity variability of rainfall. The other is related to market risks, since the transition period is 
characterized by market imperfections, and volatile and unpredictable relative prices. Due to the 
lack of credit or insurance markets in rural areas, a diversification strategy from agriculture to 
forestry can be an efficient ex ante risk management mechanism for rural risk-averse households. 
As predicted by portfolio choice models, a risk increment in agriculture should lead to a higher 
share of land allocated to forests. The existing literature on forest resources variations in China 
also points out the importance of institutional risks, the most important being unsecured land 
tenure (Yin and Newman, 1997; Zhang et al., 2000; Rozelle et al., 2004). Dummy variables for the 
household responsibility system are thus usually introduced in empirical analyses. However, we 
cannot consider this change here since our data start in 1984, when the household responsibility 
system was already largely developed throughout the whole country.  
As regards land quality, several papers have shown that land quality can help increasing 
forest area (Rozelle et al., 2004; Xu et al., 2004). Moreover, the question of the relative scarcity of 
                                                     
7 In 1979, the timber procurement prices rose by 30.6% and in 1990, they increased further by 48% in the northern State forestry 
regions.  
8 In 1997, some of them had a transaction value above one billion Yuan.  
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land is crucial in China where land is a basic production factor for feeding a large population, 
which can create conflicts in land-use choices. On the one hand, if demographic pressure is 
particularly strong, preference might be given to agricultural activities rather than afforestation. 
On the other hand, improvements in agricultural productivity might help reducing the pressure 
upon land and thus favor longer term activities such as forestry.  
Lastly, the decentralization process that occurred during the reform period has been 
accompanied by several changes in rural areas, the most striking being the development of rural 
industry through township and villages enterprises (TVEs) (Chen, 2000). The emergence of these 
dynamic rural collective enterprises favored the diversification of rural activities (e.g. the 
development of off-farm activities), as well as the improvement of rural revenues and living 
standards (Yang, 2003). Higher incomes and saving capacity in rural areas can be expected to 
increase the incentives for longer term investments such as forestry investments, since less 
pressure is put on day-to-day food-related needs. In addition, higher incomes can also facilitate 
the entry into forestry activity, which requires substantial long-term investment. However, as 
wealth is also an important ex-post insurance tool against risk, a substitution effect can partly 
compensate the positive income effect. Indeed, higher incomes and saving capacity can 
encourage rural households to direct their savings towards other investments (such as real estate, 
insurance, etc.) and then, allow them to increase their agricultural activity without fearing risks. 
As far as the diversification of activities in rural area is concerned, both an income effect and a 
substitution effect are also at stake, which makes the overall impact on afforestation effort 
undetermined. Indeed, on the one hand, less important needs for agricultural activities reduce 
pressures on forest land and might thus favor the extension of the forest cover rate. On the 
other hand, the diversification of income sources provides insurance alternatives and reduces the 
incidence of agricultural risks. Therefore, the emergence of new activities might also encourage 
rural households to focus on other sources of investment than forestry.  
 
 18
4. Empirical evidence on the determinants of afforestation in China 
 
a. The data 
The econometric study relies on data gathered on an annual basis for as many provinces 
as possible using various Chinese sources described in Appendix 2. The database used in the 
following econometric analysis thus covers 25 Chinese provinces and autonomous regions over 
the period from 1984 to 2001. Due to numerous missing values, Beijing,9 Tianjin and Shanghai 
municipalities directly under the Central Government as well as Tibet autonomous region and 
Hainan province are excluded from the quantitative analysis. Moreover, as Chongqing area was 
given a municipality status only from 1997 onwards, available data before 1997 do not allow 
distinguishing between Sichuan province and Chongqing municipality, which are thus gathered. 
A description of all variables introduced in the empirical analysis is provided in Appendix 
2. More specifically, to measure households’ wealth, we use information on their productive 
assets and we compute a wealth composite index, as a linear combination of household assets 
indicators through principal components analysis. We selected three indicators reflecting several 
productive fixed assets owned by rural households: large and medium tractors, mini and walking 
tractors and carts with rubber tires. Results of the principal components analysis are given in 
Appendix 3. They give the eigenvector estimates, as well as summary statistics for each variable. 
We only use the first principal component (with an eigenvalue of 1.87), which accounts for 62 
per cent of the variance in our indicators. 
Weather variability is measured with an annual precipitation variation index, using 
monthly precipitations for the capital of each province, and following the methodology 
proposed by Gurgand (2003). The method consists in computing the annual deviation of 
                                                     
9 Beijing municipality does not produce much timber but undertook important efforts to improve its level of afforestation, as 
suggested by its third rank (after Guangdong and Shaanxi) in the afforestation scale. 
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precipitations in comparison with a “norm” defined for every month as being the average 









ijitjit mmp       (2) 
where i, t and j denote respectively a given province, a given year and a given month, mitj 
measures monthly precipitation in province i, during year t and ijm  measures the average 
monthly precipitation in province i, over the whole period. Figure 3 shows the evolution of this 
index for several provinces in South China (Guangdong and Fujian) and in North-eastern China 
(Inner Mongolia and Jilin). It underlines the variability of precipitations, particularly in South 
China where climatic fluctuations are quite important. The relatively high frequency of floods in 
this region where agricultural activities are intensive probably entails a higher risk for them.  
<Insert Figure 3> 
Table 3 illustrates some of the existing disparities among regions for variables included in 
subsequent regressions. It shows that Southern provinces (South and South-west) are those 
where the highest proportion of land is allocated to tree planting, with an average of 8 hectares 
of afforested land for 100 hectares of cultivated land, namely twice the ratio for Northern 
provinces (mean tests confirm that the difference is statistically significant). These statistics 
confirm the stronger incentives for afforestation in provinces that were not traditionally well-
endowed in forest resources, and that made greater effort to develop a diversified forestry 
activity (from timber to non-timber products) during the reform period. Southern provinces are 
also characterized by an intensive agricultural activity, with on average two harvests a year and a 
more developed irrigation system than in other provinces. But they also face strong constraints 
in terms of population density and they depend on higher weather variations (both variables for 
the South region are one standard deviation more than the mean value). 
<Insert Table 3> 










1 γγγγα     (3) 
where Y is the annual land-use choice, measured as the ratio of afforested land over cultivated 
land. X1 is the relative return of agricultural to forestry activities (measured through relative 
prices), X2 a set of variables representing risks (precipitation variations and relative price 
variability), X3 a set of variables representing land quality/scarcity (multiple cropping index, 
irrigation and agricultural population density), and X4 a set of variables representing changes in 
the socio-economic environment (wealth and diversification of income sources).  
The data set being a panel of provinces over years, the error term can be expressed as 
follows:  
  itiitu εα +=           (4) 
where αi is a province-specific parameter, introduced to take account of unmeasured features 
specific to the provinces concerned (reforms, property rights or location differences). As shown 
in Table 4, the Breush and Pagan LM test for specific effects indicates that a specific-effect 
model is to be preferred to a pooled specification, and the Hausman test indicates that the fixed-
effect specification is to be preferred to a random-effect one. In the estimated specifications, all 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year to account for the fact that land-use decision is 
made given the information set available at the end of the preceding year. This allows reducing 
endogeneity problems, but at the cost of one year observation loss. Hence, our data set 
effectively starts from 1986 instead of 1985 to 2001, a period of 16 years.10  
Last but not least, it is important to come back to the data quality issue briefly raised in 
Section 2. On the one hand, it is important to note that the use of afforestation data does not 
allow taking account of survival rates. This means that our analysis only focuses on the efforts 
made by rural economic agents to plant trees and does not take account of harvesting or planted 
                                                     
10 To control for the potential bias induced by the exceptionally high rates of afforestation observed in 1985, we have chosen to 
estimate equation (3) without this particular year. 
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trees that do not survive. However, using afforestation data (as opposed to forest cover data) 
allows reducing problems linked with forest coverage definition changes, as highlighted in 
Section 2.  
 
b. Econometric results 
Estimation results of this “land-use choice” equation are reported in Table 4. They 
provide an evaluation of the relative importance of economic motivations in the afforestation 
decision. The model explains one third of variations in land-use choice, and most variables are 
significant at the usual threshold level of 5 per cent with the expected sign. 
First, estimation results show a negative relationship between the agriculture-to-forestry 
relative price level and afforestation efforts, which illustrates the determination of land-use 
choice according to the expected relative return of competing activities in a more market-based 
economy. Hence, the estimated coefficient associated to the relative price level supports the 
assertion that higher agricultural relative prices encourage farmers to keep land for agricultural 
purposes, and reduce the incentives to plant trees, other things being equal. 
<Insert Table 4> 
Concerning the impact of risk, both agricultural production risks (precipitation variation) 
and market risks (the relative price volatility) tend to encourage afforestation, all things being 
equal. The estimation of the land-use choice equation indeed shows positive and significant 
coefficients associated with both the precipitation variation index (although weakly significant) 
and the relative price variation. These results indicate that besides the immediate relative 
profitability of agriculture, the existence of risks encourages rural households to adopt a 
diversification strategy in the use of land, by allocating part of it to tree plantings. And indeed, 
following the different plantation campaigns in the 1980s and the allocation of private plots to 
households, rural households have been encouraged to plant trees (especially for non-timber 
products purposes) and to diversify their productive activities. 
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As for land quality and scarcity, the estimation results give an evaluation of the 
importance of demographic pressure over land as a determinant for land-use choice between 
agriculture and forestry. On the one hand, the agricultural population density has a negative 
impact on afforestation effort. On the other hand, the quality of land, measured through both 
irrigation and the multiple cropping index, which participates to the increase in the total factor 
productivity in agriculture, tends to reduce pressure upon land and contributes positively to 
afforestation efforts. Therefore, the negative impact of demographic pressure might thus be 
offset by the positive impact of technological progress. 
As regards the effect of households’ wealth on their incentive to plant trees, the 
introduction of the households’ assets composite index calculated through principal components 
analysis shows a positive effect on afforestation. This result implies that wealthier households (in 
terms of productive assets) tend to allocate relatively more land to tree planting, all things being 
equal. On the opposite, the non-significant coefficient associated with diversification suggests 
that, neither the income effect, nor the substitution effect dominates in afforestation decision. 
Hence, the existence of alternative activities such as rural industry, might reduce pressure over 
land and favor afforestation, but it seems that in China, this effect is at least partly offset by the 
fact that diversification in economic activities in rural areas has played as a substitute to forestry 
as insurance against risk.11 One explanation for this particular evolution certainly lies in the fact 
that, although efforts have been done towards securing property rights of farmers on trees (see 
Section 2), evidence shows that tenure insecurity remains a major problem in rural China (Xu et 
al., 2002). In this context, investing in long-term forest-related activities may still prove not to be 
as “secured” and efficient as other non-agricultural activities to diversify income sources and 
insure against agricultural risks. 
                                                     
11 Note that some positive indirect (and unmeasured) effects certainly also come from diversification, including the increase in 




The purpose of this paper is to highlight the determinants of afforestation efforts in 
China, using available macro-economic information at a province level over the period from 
1984 to 2001. By focusing on economic factors that drive afforestation, we mainly refer here to 
afforestation done by households and collectives, rather than by the State, even though available 
data preclude from clearly separating these categories in our analysis. Using panel data for a 
sample of 25 provinces throughout the period, the quantitative analysis suggests that land 
allocation between agriculture and afforestation is driven by economic factors including 
profitability, production and market risks pressure upon land and household wealth. 
Our findings have several policy implications, which might be worthwhile to underline in 
the current context of a growing interest for environment and natural resources protection in 
China. They particularly suggest that economic reforms that have been implemented since the 
end of the 1970s have had important, although contrasting, effects in terms of land allocation 
towards forest. It can be clearly seen that accounting for the relative profitability and risk of 
activities has become a significant element in activity choices, on which economic policies 
oriented towards the market might have an impact. Hence, as timber prices have been kept for a 
long time at very low level by administrative measures, timber markets should be further 
developed so that prices reflect the real value of timber and the actual supply-demand structure 
of the country.  
As for the socio-economic environment, the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, both 
increased incomes in rural China and the higher agricultural productivity have led to an increase 
in incentives to start forestry activities. By stressing the importance of land quality and 
agricultural productivity in a country where arable land is a scarce resource, our results entail that 
in order to foster afforestation, emphasis should be put on a better maintenance of the irrigation 
system as well as on the improvement of agricultural productivity through technological progress 
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and mechanization. They also suggest that in regions where agricultural productivity is low, 
accompanying measures are needed to help farmers in diversifying their activities. The current 
Sloping Land Conversion Program (SLCP) supports this idea since both cash and grain subsidies 
are provided to peasants for each converted hectare over a period of 5 to 8 years12. 
Lastly, our results show that the increase in the sources of income in rural areas had no 
strong impact on afforestation incentives: on average the substitution effect has been as large as 
the income effect. This result implies that along with the diversification of income sources in 
rural China, it might be important to target policies toward increasing incentives for farmers to 
keep on planting trees even though forest-related activities are getting less important. In this 
regard, the empirical evidence (Xu et al. 2002, Hyde et al. 2003) points out that highly unsecured 
property rights on trees discourage farmers to invest in this activity. Therefore, giving greater 
incentives for an efficient and sustainable forest management as well as relieving the pressure on 
forest certainly require to enforce stable property rights. This might be all the more important 
since in most rural areas in China, poverty is still persisting, and insurance and credit markets are 
absent or imperfect (Jalan and Ravallion, 2001). While facing substantial risks, rural households 
have limited access to mechanisms likely to reduce risks associated with production, but also to 
health, etc. In this perspective, allocating land to forest can be viewed as a risk-reducing 
mechanism at the household level.  
 
References 
Chen, H. (2000), The Institutional Transition of China’s Township and Village Enterprises: Market 
Liberalization, Contractual Form Innovation and Privatization, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Food and Agriculture Organization (2003), The State of the World’s Forests 2003, Rome: FAO. 
                                                     
12 The cash subsidy is 300 Yuan/ha per year. To account for differences in regional average yields, the annual grain subsidy 
varies between the Yangtze River Basin (2250 kg/ha) and the Yellow River Basin (1500 kg/ha). The subsidies timeline depends 
on the type of tree planted (ecological forests or economic forests).  
 25
Gurgand, M. (2003), ‘Farmer education and the weather: Evidence from Taiwan (1976-1992)’, 
Journal of Development Economics 71(1): 51-70. 
Harkness, J. (1998), ‘Recent Trends in Forestry and Conservation of Biodiversity in China’, China 
Quarterly 156: 911-934. 
Hyde W. F., B. Belcher and J. Xu (2003), China’s Forests: Global Lessons from Market Reforms, 
Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future Press. 
Jalan, J. and M. Ravallion (2001), ‘Behavioral Responses to Risk in Rural China’, Journal of 
Development Economics 66(1): 23-49. 
Lu, W., N. Landell-Mills, J. Liu, J. Xu and C. Liu (2002), Getting the private sector to work for the public 
good: Instruments for sustainable private sector forestry in China, London: International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED), Instruments for sustainable private sector 
forestry series. 
National Bureau of Statistics (1985-2002), China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistics 
Press. 
Richardson, S. D. (1990), Forests and Forestry in China, Washington DC: Island Press. 
Rozelle, S. D., V. Benziger and J. Huang (2004), ‘Forest Exploitation and Protection in Reform 
China: Assessing the Impacts of Policy and Economic Growth’, in W. F. Hyde, B. 
Belcher and J. Xu, (eds.), China’s Forests: Global Lessons from Market Reforms, Washington 
D.C.: Resources for the Future, pp. 109-133. 
Rozelle, S. D., J. Huang, A. Husain and A. Zazueta (2000), China: From Afforestation to Poverty 
Alleviation and Natural Forest Management, Washington DC: the World Bank. 
Shi, P. and J. Xu (2000), ‘Deforestation in China’, Mimeographed, Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy (CCAP), Beijing. 
Smil, V. (1997), ‘China’s Environment and Natural Resources’, in C. Hudson, (ed.), The China 
Handbook, Chicago and London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, pp. 188-197. 
 26
State Forestry Administration (1985a-2001a), China Forestry Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China 
Forestry Publishing House. 
State Forestry Administration (2000b), Forest Resources Statistics of China, 1994-1998, Beijing: State 
Forestry Administration. 
Wang, S. and A. Hu (1999), The Political Economy of Uneven Development, The Case of China, Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe. 
Wang, S., G. C. van Kooten and B. Wilson (2004), ‘Mosaic of reform: forest policy in post-1978 
China’, Forest Policy and Economics 6(1): 71-83. 
Xu, J., E. Katsigris and T. A. White (2002), Implementing the Natural Forest Protection Program and the 
Sloping Land Conversion Program: Lessons and Policy Recommendations, China Council for 
International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) Task Force on 
Forests and Grasslands, Beijing: China Forestry Publishing Housing. 
Xu, J., R. Tao and G. S. Amacher (2004), ‘An empirical analysis of China's state-owned forests ’, 
Forest Policy and Economics 6(3-4): 379-390. 
Yang, W. (2003), ‘Reforms, agricultural risks and agro-industrial diversification in rural China: 
Evidence from Chinese Provinces’, Etudes et Documents 2003-18, CERDI, Clermont-
Ferrand. http://www.cerdi.org/Publi/ED_Detail.asp?Id=442. 
Yin, R. (1994), ‘China’s Rural Forestry since 1949’, Journal of World Forest Resource Management 7: 
73-100. 
Yin, R. (1998), ‘Forestry and the Environment in China: the Current Situation and Strategic 
Choices’, World development 26(12): 2153-2167. 
Yin, R. and D. H. Newman (1997), ‘Impacts of rural reforms: the case of the Chinese forest 
sector’, Environment and Development Economics 2: 291-305. 
Zhang, Y. (2000), ‘Deforestation and Forest Transition: Theory and Evidence in China’, in M. 
Palo and H. Vanhanen, (eds.), World Forests from Deforestation to Forest Transition?, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 41-65. 
 27
Zhang, Y., G. Dai, H. Huang, F. Kong, Z. Tian, X. Wang and L. Zhang (1999), ‘The Forest 
Sector in China: Towards a Market Economy’, in M. Palo and J. Uusivuori, (eds.), World 
Forests, Society and Environment, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp 371-393. 
Zhang, Y., J. Uusivuori and J. Kuuluvainen (2000), ‘Econometric analysis of the causes of forest 
land use changes in Hainan, China’, Canadian Journal of Forest Resources 30: 1913-21. 
 28
Table 1 – Trends in forest resources in China 
 Forested land 
(million hectares) 
Forest cover (%) Standing timber stock* 
(million cubic meters) 
1934 86.25 9  
1951-62 85.47 8.9 7 020.76 
1973-76 (1st census) 121.86 12.7 9 532.27 
1977-81 (2nd census) 115.28 12 10 260.6 
1983-88 (3rd census) 124.65 13 10 572.5 
1989-93 (4th census) 133.7 13.9 11 785.24 
1994-98 (5th census) 158.9 16.6 12 487.86 
Notes: The referred periods indicate the period during which censuses have been conducted. Taiwan is included (Taiwan forested 
area between 1977 and 1998 remained stable around 2 million hectares). 
* Total timber stock volume of forest land (including open forest, bush, etc.) 
Sources: Zhang et al. (1999, Table 40.1), Shi and Xu (2000, Table 9), and State Forestry Administration (2000b). 
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Dominant land tenure system State Both Collective  
Total land area (1 000 km²) 1 802 2 177* 1 552 4 036 
Population density (persons/km²), 1998 49 73** 301 128 
Share of China’s forested area (%)1, 1998 26 20 38 16 
Forest area variation 
(million hectares, both open and closed forests)1, 2 
- 1980-88 (3rd census) 
- 1989-93 (4th census) 





















Share of timber inventory (%)1, 1998 32 37 18 13 
Share of total timber production, in cubic meters 
(%, 2001)3 
32.5 4 51 12.5 
Share of state forest farms production, in RMB (%, 
2001)3 
49 5 34 12 
Average afforestation (km²/1 000 km²), 1981-2001 6.1 5.4 11.7 9.8 
Afforestation by forest type (%), 1991-2001***     
 Timber 35.4 37.3 59.2 23.3 
 Shelter 49.3 33.0 11.6 39.0 
 Fuelwood 2.2 2.5 3.3 3.4 
 Economic (non-timber) 12.4 26.9 25.6 34.0 
Notes: forest regions include the following provinces: 
- North-East: Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia; 
- South-West: Sichuan (Chongqing included), Yunnan and Tibet; 
- South: Anhui, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, and Guizhou; 
- Three-North: Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, 
Qinghai, and Xinjiang. 
* Among which 1 228 for Tibet province. ** Population density without Tibet is 165. *** The total is less than 100 % since 
“forests for special use” are not included.  
Sources: 1) National forest resource censuses, 1989-93 and 1994-98, 2) Yin (1998), 3) State Forestry Administration (1985a-2001a) 
and National Bureau of Statistics (1985-2002).  
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics (1986-2001) 
 North-East South-West South “Three-North” Average 
Land allocation (afforested area / cultivated area) 
Mean 4.22 8.50 7.90 4.54 6.03 
S.D. 2.17 3.39 7.02 2.87 5.08 
Relative prices 
Mean 1.17 0.95 0.91 0.77 0.89 
S.D. 0.30 0.19 0.34 0.32 0.34 
Precipitation variation index 
Mean 29.45 46.85 70.25 33.10 47.13 
S.D. 12.38 16.24 26.03 24.73 29.45 
Relative prices variation 
Mean 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 
S.D. 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Multiple cropping index 
Mean 0.89 1.52 1.97 1.19 1.47 
S.D. 0.12 0.40 0.38 0.33 0.53 
Irrigation (%) 
Mean 0.22 0.40 0.64 0.49 0.50 
S.D. 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.23 0.23 
Population density (%) 
Mean 2.76 12.15 15.15 6.94 9.81 
S.D. 0.71 2.79 4.12 2.71 5.51 
Diversification (%) 
Mean 0.31 0.13 0.24 0.26 0.25 
S.D. 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.11 
Rural households’ assets  (composite index) 
Mean 1.93 -0.97 -0.89 0.49 0.05 
S.D. 0.88 1.06 0.69 1.21 1.38 
Notes: “Land allocation” is measured as a ratio of afforested land during a given year over cultivated land (x 100); relative prices 
are measured by the ratio of agriculture to forestry implicit deflators of production; the precipitation variation index is defined in 
the text; relative price variation is measured in absolute terms; the multiple cropping index is calculated by dividing sown area by 
cultivated area; irrigation is measured as a ratio of irrigated land over cultivated land; population density is measured by the ratio 
of agricultural population over cultivated land; diversification is measured by the ratio of employment in TVEs over rural 
employment and rural households’ assets are computed from principal component analysis, as explained in the text. 
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Table 4 – Determinants of afforestation effort (1986-2001) 
Dependent variable: Afforested land over cultivated land, per  province, per year 
 Land allocation 
Relative prices level  -4.53 (-4.05) 
Weather  0.01 (1.44) 
Relative prices variation 4.69 (1.62) 
Multiple cropping index 3.06 (2.48) 
Irrigation 22.18 (5.30) 
Agricultural population density  -0.71 (-2.89) 
Diversification 2.04 (0.77) 
Rural assets 0.95 (1.97) 
Time trend -0.30 (-3.99) 
  
Number of observations 400 [25 x 16] 
Estimation method Fixed effects 
LM test 145.49 [χ²(1)] 
Hausman Test 76.06 [χ²(9)] 
R² (within) 0.29 
Notes: Due to missing observations, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hainan and Tibet are not included in the data set. All explanatory 
variables are lagged one year. The values shown between brackets are the Student t values. The estimated standard deviations 
have been corrected using a White matrix.  
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Figure 1 – Annual total afforestation in China (1952-2001) 
Sources: State Forestry Administration (1985a-2001a). 
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Notes: computed from provincial data. The fifth forest category (forests for special use) is not included in the figure since its share 
is always less than 1 % of total afforestation. 


























Figure 3 – Precipitation variation index for some Northern and Southern selected 
provinces 
 

















Appendix 1 – Forest categories definition according to the Forest Law 
(Adopted on 20 September 1984) 
 
 
Article 4. The forest falls into the following five categories: 
(1) Shelter forest: the forest, forest trees, and groves that are mainly used as shelter. They 
consist of forest for protecting headwaters of rivers, forest for conserving water and soil, 
windbreak and sand-fixation forest, farm and pastureland shelter forest, embankment protective 
belts, and road protection belts. 
(2) Timber forest: it comprises timber-producing forest and forest trees as well as bamboo 
forest producing bamboo products. 
(3) Economic forest: the forest trees that mainly produce fruits, edible oil, ingredients of 
drinks, condiments, industrial materials, medicinal herbs, etc. 
(4) Fuel forest: the forest trees that are mainly used as fuel. 
(5) Forest for special uses: the forest and forest trees that are mainly for defense, 
environmental protection, and scientific experiment purposes. They include forest for defense, 
forest for experiment, maternal forest, forest for environmental protection, scenic forest, as well 
as the forest trees in scenic and historical spots and places with historic significance in the 
Chinese revolution, and the forest in natural preservation zones. 
 
Source: Richardson (1990, pp. 312-313). 
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Appendix 2 – Data sources and definitions 
 
The database has been constructed from a number of different official Chinese sources, 
including the China Forestry Statistical Yearbook, the China Statistical Yearbook, the Township and 
Village Enterprises Yearbook of China, the Rural Statistical Yearbook of China, China Regional Economy: 
A Profile of 17 years of Reform and Opening-up and Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 years 
of New China.  
The list of indicators used in the empirical analysis is the following: 
- Land allocation: ratio of afforested area in a giving year over cultivated land.  
- Relative prices: relative return indicator (capturing the changes in relative prices in real 
terms), measured by the ratio of the implicit deflator of agricultural production to that of 
forestry. Implicit deflators are calculated from the gross output value of farming (forestry) in 
current prices and indices of gross output value of farming (forestry) given in the China 
Statistical Yearbook. The relative prices variation is measured as the annual variation of the 
relative prices level in absolute terms. 
- Precipitation variation index: agricultural risk indicator, see definition in the text.  
- Multiple cropping index: agricultural land quality indicator, calculated by dividing sown area 
by cultivated land.  
- Irrigation ratio: land quality indicator, measured as the share of irrigated land in total 
cultivated land.  
- Population density: demographic pressure on land, measured by the ratio of agricultural 
population over cultivated land.  
- Rural households’ assets: rural wealth indicator computed from principal component 
analysis, as explained in the text. 
- Diversification index: the share of employment of rural enterprises in total rural 
employment. 
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Appendix 3 – Principal components analysis 
 
Eigenvector and summary statistics for variables entering the computation of the first 
principal component for the households’ productive assets indicator: 
 
Variable Eigenvector Mean Standard 
deviation 
Number of large and medium tractors owned per 
rural household 
0.635 0.009 0.010 
Number of mini and walking tractors owned per 
rural household 
0.5461 0.113 0.120 
Number of carts with rubber tires owned per rural 
household 
0.547 0.104 0.116 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (1985-2002). 
 
